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The takings clause of the fifth amendment' is, as every constitu-
tional lawyer knows, the source of some of the murkiest constitutional
law. This, as every constitutional lawyer also knows, is quite a dis-
tinction. The extant judicial "tests" for compensable takings are
extremely vague and thus predictably unpredictable and inconsistent
in their application.2 The theories that academics have designed to
supplant the judicial tests are quite abstract and incapable of easy
translation into concrete decisions or intermediate rules, normatively
problematic, and/or only tenuously connected to the constitutional
text.3 In other words, despite a mountain of case law and academic
theorizing, there remains a giant vacuum in the analysis of the takings
clause for a new theory to fill.
Richard Epstein's book, Takings,4 is designed to fill that vacuum.
Epstein neglects neither the normative buttressing for his theory of
takings, its tie to the Constitution, nor its translation into concrete
decisions and intermediate rules for judicial application. In short, his
is a complete theory of the takings clause, and the only such theory
around.
Epstein's theory is not only complete, but it is also powerful.
Part of its power, of course, lies in its completeness-its linkage of
normative values, constitutional text, institutional realities, and illus-
trative cases. But its power is also a product of Epstein's argumenta-
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego; B.A., Williams College, 1965; LL.B., Yale
University, 1968.
1. "(N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Teleprompter Co. v. Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (1982); San Diego Gas & Elec. v.
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
3. The previous major academic attempts to produce a theory of takings are: B.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
4. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985) [hereinafter (p. _)].
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tive skills, the amazing erudition and impeccable sense of the logic of
positions that he displays over and over again for three hundred and
fifty pages. Even if one ultimately disagrees with Epstein's conclu-
sions, as I do, such disagreement is to a great extent overshadowed by
respect and even awe.
Nevertheless, I do disagree with Epstein. Epstein's theory is
erected upon, and follows logically from, three premises, each of
which I either reject or at least have substantial doubts about. I shall
label these premises the "interpretive thesis," the "natural rights the-
sis," and the "utility thesis." In brief, Epstein argues that the takings
clause of the Constitution, properly interpreted, proscribes the
destruction (=takings) of any right in the bundle of property rights
enforceable at common law against private individuals or groups
(= property), except insofar as public goods are realizable and overall
wealth can be increased (= public use), and then only if all share pro
rata in the increase in wealth (=just compensation) (p. 19-31). That
is the interpretive thesis. He argues further that such constitutional
protection of common law property is consistent with Lockean natu-
ral rights over resources that preexist the state-the natural rights
thesis (p. 10). Finally, he argues that constitutional protection of
Lockean natural rights over property realizes welfarist goals better
than current, laxer interpretations of the takings clause, primarily by
discouraging legislatures from engaging in wealth-destructive, rent
seeking behavior-the utility thesis (p. 306-29).
In sum, Epstein finds in the Constitution a conception of private
property and governmental power that gives both Lockean libertari-
ans and welfare liberals all they can possibly want without distorting
constitutional interpretation in the process. The miracle of 1787? I
think not.
II. THE INTERPRETIVE THESIS
The least attended to leg of the tripod upon which Epstein rests
his theory of the takings clause is the interpretive thesis. Epstein
devoted only one, twelve-page chapter to constitutional interpretation
per se (pp. 19-31). And the proceedings of the Conference that is
memorialized in these pages touches hardly at all upon the topic.' All
of this is surprising given the fact that Epstein is writing about a spe-
cific clause in our Constitution and not about political theory in the
abstract. It is even more surprising given the enormous amount of ink
spilled in the last several years on the topic of constitutional interpre-
5. Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 49 (1986) [hereinafter Proceedings, supra p. _.].
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tation.6 It surely suggests that Epstein is far more interested in polit-
ical theory than in the specifics of the Constitution.
Epstein's favored method of constitutional interpretation is to
adhere to the (1787) core semantic meanings of the words of the text
(pp. 22-26). He eschews reliance on the various and possibly conflict-
ing purposes and specific conceptions of the ill-defined groups of per-
sons we call the framers (pp. 26-29). The basic cast of his argument
on behalf of textual literalism is utilitarian: it provides us with stable,
predictable, publicly accessible meanings for our fundamental law, a
law applied by a nonelected judiciary (pp. 19-20, 22-26). And, of
course, Epstein believes that the method is possible; words do have
stable core semantic meanings, even when used by people with differ-
ent goals and different specific denotations, and even when applied in
quite diverse social and technological environments.
Epstein's theory of constitutional interpretation is subject to two
kinds of criticism. First, there is the internal criticism that Epstein
applies the theory inconsistently. And second, there is the external
criticism that Epstein fails to link up his theory of interpretation with
any theory of why the Constitution is our fundamental source of legal
authority.
The most glaring inconsistency in Epstein's application of his lit-
eralist approach is with respect to what acts count as takings of prop-
erty.7 Epstein argues that takings should include any destruction of
rights within the property bundle (pp. 35-104). But his argument is
not based on the word's semantic meaning, but on his nontextual
argument that the framers did not convey to the government any
power over others' property not possessed by individuals at common
law, except where public goods are realizable and just compensation is
paid. While that is an argument for a broad construction of takings, it
is surely not the argument of a textual literalist.
A second internal inconsistency is Epstein's treatment of the
incorporation of the takings clause into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Epstein is launching a constitutional attack
on the major features of the regulatory welfare state, including the
redistribution of wealth. His attack succeeds against the federal gov-
ernment if the fifth amendment means what he says. Yet a vast
amount of regulation and redistribution is state and local in origin
6. See, e.g., Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium:
Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981);
Symposium: Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 443 (1983); Symposium: Judicial Review Versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
7. See J. Paul, Searchingfor the Status Quo (Book Review), 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743, 751
(1986).
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and governed, not by the fifth amendment, but by the fourteenth
amendment, which includes no takings clause.8 Epstein offhandedly
acknowledges in a couple of places in his book that he is only assum-
ing for the sake of argument that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment incorporates the takings clause, and that if
incorporation is wrong, his arguments would be limited to actions of
the federal government (pp. 18, 307 n.2). But given the enormous
consequences riding on incorporation, and given that incorporation is
prima facie inconsistent with textual literalism, it is surprising that
Epstein argues throughout the book as if incorporation were correct.
The external criticism of Epstein's theory of constitutional inter-
pretation is that he does not relate his theory to the Constitution's
status as fundamental law.9 Ultimately, the justification of an inter-
pretive method must lie in the practical point of the interpretive pro-
ject. If in interpreting the Constitution we are attempting to divine
the norms that we have decided shall be supreme in our practical
affairs, our interpretive method must be consistent with our reasons
for giving these norms this supreme status. One reason to favor a
method is the utility of the method in securing a stable and accessible
public meaning of the Constitution. But it is the only reason upon
which Epstein relies to support his method of textual literalism, and it
is insufficient alone to prove Epstein's case.
When I say that to be acceptable, a method of constitutional
interpretation must reflect why the Constitution is considered author-
itative, I am surely not suggesting that we should interpret the Consti-
tution as morally ideal. Of course, if the Constitution is morally ideal,
its practical authoritativeness is unproblematic. But although every
constitutional author aspires to create the morally ideal constitution,
the wisdom of constitutionalism lies in the understanding that treat-
ing an actual constitution as if it already were morally ideal is usually
less morally ideal than treating it according to some interpretive
methodology that does not assume it to be morally ideal. In other
words, a constitution that contains only the command to act wisely
and justly would be useless as a constitution and lead to less wisdom
and justice than a constitution that attempts to specify more con-
cretely which actions are wise and just, coupled with an interpretive
methodology that preserves the specifications and hence the possibil-
ity that the specifications will differ from what the interpreter person-
8. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1986).
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ally considers wise and just. And the method of interpretation that
leaves open the possibility that the constitution so interpreted will be
less than morally ideal is itself justified by being more likely to pro-
duce a morally superior state of affairs than any other interpretive
methodology.
Put somewhat differently, every normative decision constitutes
both a recommendation of the substantive result reached and the
method of decision-making employed-both the substance of the
decision and its form. And what ultimately justifies substantive
results may dictate formal methodologies for reaching those results
that create the possibility that the result reached is substantively
wrong. Constitutionalism and its interpretive methodologies are the
formal dimension of our society's decision regarding how to govern
substantively wisely and justly.
As the preceding paragraph illustrates, the arguments for a par-
ticular method of constitutional interpretation are complex, specula-
tive, and steeped in paradox.10 Epstein believes he can vanquish
opposing methodologies by pointing out the utility of literalism. He
cannot.
Of course, Epstein may feel less necessity to defend his interpre-
tive method because when applied to the Constitution, it yields a
meaning that is morally ideal for Epstein. If you agree with Epstein's
normative values, and if incorporation can be squared with literalism,
the Constitution interpreted a la Epstein is the ideal constitution, at
least in the sense that its principles are the correct ones to hold. That
result of interpretation does in fact support Epstein's choice of inter-
pretive methods, although it is still theoretically possible that the
method in the hands of those who are likely to be judges will lead to
results less ideal in terms of Epstein's own values than the results
derived from a different method. But surely the initial attractiveness
of textual literalism as a method of interpretation, which is largely a
product of its ease and stability, is greatly enhanced when literal inter-
pretations produce morally attractive outcomes.
Because Epstein's method of constitutional interpretation pro-
duces a constitution that embodies the political and moral values that
he believes to be correct, Epstein is able to avoid the question of the
10. I have touched on these problems elsewhere. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection
Theories.: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 5-9 (1981);
Alexander, Painting Without the Numbers: Noninterpretive Judicial Review, 8 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 447, 458-62 (1983); Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 (1985)
(formal rules and substantive aims generally); see also Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIo
ST. L.J. 187 (1981).
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legitimate authority of the Constitution. I I said that the Constitution
must be interpreted by a method that assumes the Constitution to be
supreme legitimate authority.12 There may, however, be no method of
interpretation that can preserve the legitimate authority of the Consti-
tution, even if the method is derived to reflect such authority. Epstein
might argue that a constitution that, properly interpreted, tramples
on natural rights and undermines social welfare is still preferable, in
terms of rights and welfare, to constitutional anarchy, and that the
Constitution should therefore be regarded as legitimate and should be
changed solely through the methods it prescribes. But this is an argu-
ment that he does not have to make when the Constitution, properly
interpreted, is morally ideal.
III. THE NATURAL RIGHTS THESIS
The Richard Epstein of Takings believes in natural rights that
governments do not create, but must respect. Those natural rights
extend beyond persons' control over their bodies, labor, and talents to
dominion over natural resources. The latter natural rights are
acquired ultimately through the method of first possession recognized
at common law (pp. 216-19). The specific set of rights of dominion
over resources that one acquires through first possession is the set of
rights reflective of ownership at common law. That set-common
law property-is the property protected from takings under the fifth
amendment. The Constitution merely prevents government from tak-
ing actions it has a preconstitutional moral duty not to do anyway.
This second leg of Epstein's theory of takings is by far the weak-
est. Although I find the libertarian's natural right over one's body,
labor, and talents to be plausible, though troubling,' 3 I, like others,
find all arguments for natural rights over preexisting resources unper-
suasive. 4 That is especially true of arguments like Epstein's that are
based on first possession. The "is" of the acts of possession cannot be
made to yield any "oughts," much less the particular "oughts" of
common law property rights. Does the first act of plowing an
unowned field yield ownership of the field (and the airspace above it,
the minerals below it, etc.)? Does the first act of viewing a mountain
yield ownership of the mountain or even the view? ' 5 The acts that
11. See J. Paul, supra note 7, at 750 n.31.
12. See supra p. 226.
13. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
14. See Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the Liberal State,
28 UCLA L. REV. 816, 819-20 (1981) [hereinafter Alexander, Liberalism]; Alexander, Kidney
Pooling, 2 COcITO 15 (1984).
15. See Alexander, Liberalism, supra note 14, at 835-38; Cohen, Self-Ownership, World-
[Vol. 41:223
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constitute first possession are in themselves normatively silent.
At the Conference on his book, Epstein abandoned the natural
rights leg of his argument in favor of a much more plausible utilita-
rian position that the bundle of rights that represents common law
property, together with the first possession principle, are conventional
rights that are highly instrumental for producing welfare and, there-
fore, justified on that basis.1 6 That position is the utility thesis, and I
will discuss it in due course. For now, although Epstein has aban-
doned the natural rights thesis, I wish to make some additional criti-
cisms of it for anyone who is persuaded by its defense in Epstein's
book.
I first must point out that many libertarians who accept natural
property rights over nonhuman resources will reject the role Epstein
carves out for legitimate exercise of the eminent domain power.
Epstein deems the latter power, which authorizes nonconsensual tak-
ings of property, to be justified so long as it is exercised only to
increase wealth and each person shares in that increase in proportion
to his or her original property holdings. A strong libertarian would,
however, deny the government any power to effect nonconsensual
transfers, regardless of how beneficial the taking to the one whose
property is appropriated.' 7 For such a libertarian, only consent legiti-
mates the surrender of natural rights. Epstein argues that actual con-
sent to wealth-creating transfers is impractical because of transaction
costs, holdouts, and free riders; and he is correct. But the strong
libertarian would remain unmoved by what he would regard as a utili-
tarian corruption of the natural rights position, a corruption that
presages Epstein's ultimate abandonment.
At this point it is necessary to describe briefly Epstein's entire
natural rights scheme. In the state of nature, people, through first
possession, acquire property rights with the exact dimensions of com-
mon law rights of ownership.18 Those rights persist after formation of
the state, with two qualifications. First, individuals relinquish to the
state the right to enforce their property rights (the police power) (pp.
15-16). Second, the state has the power to take property without con-
sent so long as: (1) total wealth is increased thereby, and transaction
Ownership, and Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND Now 108 (F. Lucash ed.
1986); Cohen, Self-Ownership, World.Ownership, and Equality: Part 11, 3 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y
77 (1986); Steiner, Liberty and Equality, 29 POL. STUD. 555 (1981).
16. See also Fried, Is Liberty Possible?, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
III 91, 119-31 (S. McMurrin ed. 1982); J. Paul, supra note 7, at 60-64.
17. See Proceedings, supra p. 107-09.
18. See, e.g., E. Paul, Moral Constraints and Eminent Domain: A Review Essay, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. - (1986) (reviewing R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1986)).
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costs, holdout, and free rider problems rule out the alternative of pri-
vate transactions (public use) (pp. 161-70); and (2) the increase in
wealth is distributed to everyone pro rata (just compensation) (pp. 4-
5). The state can accomplish the latter distribution through explicit
compensation (direct payment) (pp. 182-94) or through implicit com-
pensation (indirect benefits) (pp. 195-215). The compensation must
be proportionate to everyone's pretaking holdings, except that in
some cases compensation that is in fact not so proportionate is suffi-
cient so long as before the taking no one had any reason to believe
that she would suffer or benefit disproportionately from the taking (ex
ante proportionate impact) (pp. 236-45).
Epstein's definitions of "police power" and "public use" are rela-
tively, though not totally, unproblematic under the natural rights the-
sis (that is once one allows eminent domain into the world of natural
rights). Direct compensation presents no difficulties, but implicit
compensation and the requirement of proportionate impact are differ-
ent matters.
The implicit compensation and proportionate impact require-
ments work in tandem, and together with the possibility of ex ante
compensation, threaten to undermine completely the natural fights
approach to takings. To begin with, Epstein nowhere justifies the pro-
portionate impact requirement on natural fights (or any other)
grounds. One can easily trace the argument from natural rights and
the three horsemen of transaction costs, holdouts, and free riders to
the notion that forced exchanges are justified if they increase wealth.
It is easy also to take the step that naturally follows and require that
the government distribute the surplus wealth so that no one is worse
off than before the taking. But the rationale for proportionate shares
is opaque.1 9 Why not equal shares?20 Utility-maximizing shares?
Maximum shares? The natural rights thread, weakened already by
the allowance of forced exchanges, has vanished by the time we get to
the pro rata distribution of surplus.
Epstein allows implicit compensation in the first place because he
recognizes that requiring direct compensation will often be far too
costly administratively in terms of calculating the amount that each
piece of non-police-power regulation (each taking) benefits and bur-
dens each individual (pp. 199-202). People would ex ante give up the
right to the precise determination of whether they proportionately
shared in the takings surplus to prevent absolute reduction of their
shares through costly administrative procedures. Indeed, even when
19. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. See J. Paul, supra note 7, at 769.
[Vol. 41:223
TAKINGS OF PROPERTY
the actual disproportionate impact of a rule on people becomes
clear--even when it is clear that some people are worse off than
before, and not just disproportionately better off-Epstein is willing to
allow the rule to stand in ex ante even though no one could determine
whether the taking would affect a given individual disproportionately
or adversely (pp. 236-45).21
It is clear that Epstein's qualification of implicit and proportion-
ate compensation by realism concerning administrative costs and by
arguments ex ante leads him very close to pure Rawlsianism.22
Because for Epstein the state of nature is not historically, but only
logically, prior to the state, the "time" of the ex ante analysis can
logically precede and thus qualify even the original acquisition of
property. If we further assume that courts will be deferential to legis-
lative judgments regarding whether a particular regulation or tax will
increase social wealth and whether the long-term interests of the least
advantaged will be maximized, then the takings clause becomes not a
fortress for natural rights, but a virtually toothless component of a
Rawlsian welfare state.23 Almost every program that Epstein believes
fails the takings test-and surely among those the redistribution of
wealth to the poor (pp. 306-29) and many regulations of wages and
prices (pp. 274-82)--can be plausibly supported as increasing social
wealth otherwise unobtainable because of transaction costs, holdouts,
and free riders, and as distributing that increase in a way that would
be ex ante acceptable.
IV. THE UTILITY THESIS
The third prop for Epstein's theory of takings is the utility thesis,
namely, that the reading he gives to the takings clause will lead to
more welfare, and welfare that is more equitably distributed, than any
alternative reading (pp. 306-29). The welfare gains occur on three
fronts. First, the specific contours of common law property rights are
utilitarian because they establish fixed and knowable boundaries and
promote productive uses and exchanges (pp. 58-62). Second, the
"public use" requirement that the government not take property
except where total wealth is increased and where alternative, consent-
based avenues are impractical prevents wealth-destructive, rent seek-
ing behavior by legislatures (pp. 199-209). Third, the requirement of
proportionate impact buttresses the defense against governmental
21. See supra note 15.
22. See J. Paul, supra note 7, at 773.
23. Id. at 772-73.
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rentseeking by making such activity more difficult to disguise as
wealth-creating (p. 204).
The utility thesis is worthy of serious study, perhaps even study
extending beyond the armchair empiricism that we normally prefer.
From my armchair, however, I doubt that Epstein's version of the
takings clause will prove utilitarian-superior to all alternatives. Com-
mon law property does not always have clear boundary lines, and
other conceptions of property might prove preferable on utility
grounds. Indeed, Epstein's desire to argue from natural law and from
the text causes him to construe property rights in ways that are
vaguer than necessary or desirable if utility is the goal. Moreover,
destructive rent seeking behavior by legislatures might be averted by
judicial standards that differ significantly from Epstein's mix of inter-
mediate scrutiny of all regulations and the concomitant judicial
inquiry into whether wealth has been created and distributed propor-
tionately. At this level again, Epstein's desire to retain the natural
rights and interpretive theses precludes him from fully considering
alternative takings clause methodologies from the utility maximiza-
tion perspective. There is a chance the utility thesis is correct, but it is
surely unproven.
Epstein's book is must reading for anyone interested in the tak-
ings clause or, for that matter, in constitutional law in general.
(There are, in fact, aside from the chapter on constitutional interpre-
tation, a substantial number of pages devoted to other issues of consti-
tutional law, at least as they intersect with the takings clause.)24 It is
also must reading for the much broader audience of those interested
in political theory. And, it is always both instructive and fun to
observe a powerful mind in action.
Nevertheless, I doubt that much of the substance of the book will
"take," either in the academic world, or in the world of lawyers,
judges, and politicians that Epstein especially wishes to influence.
Ideological hostility to his theory is part of the reason Epstein will not
succeed, but it will not be the entire explanation. The three theses
that Epstein offers to support his position are each insufficient to do so
individually, and it is not possible to add them together to create a
super argument. Utility is not the right kind of argument for buttress-
ing an implausible position on natural rights, and vice versa. And the
trail from either to a literalist mode of constitutional interpretation is
too swampy to follow. Epstein's theory of takings represents not the
serendipitous and synergistic confluence of the independent streams
24. (Pp. 88-92) (impairment of contracts); (pp. 134-40) (freedom of speech); (pp. 143-45,
210-15) (equal protection).
[Vol. 41:223
1986] TAKINGS OF PROPERTY 233
of constitutional interpretation, natural rights, and utility, but more
likely a pretty oxbow lake, cut off from the meandering common law
stream that was its origin, and destined, unreplenished by the other
streams, to dry up.
